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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]n the early 1980s, that feeling of utter despair [felt by
women diagnosed with aggressive breast cancer] started to
change as women and their families began hearing of a new
treatment that held out some hope…. Unfortunately, those
stories of success quickly turned into a misleading bandwagon
of enthusiasm. Sometimes fueled by greed and even fraud.
Tragically, thousands of women were railroaded into making
1
uninformed decisions.

I

nterest in high dose chemotherapy (HDC)2 was already
strong when Dr. Werner Bezwoda published research results supporting the procedure in 1995.3 In a 1996 publication,
Dr. Bezwoda touted his research as proof that HDC was superior to conventional treatments for metastatic breast cancer.4
Influenced by Dr. Bezwoda’s claims, and despite the fact that
other research had shown no benefit for women undergoing
HDC, as many as 6,000 women a year paid between $100,000
and $200,000 apiece to undergo the procedure.5 HDC had become big business, providing a substantial profit margin to physicians and hospitals performing the procedure.6 No one wanted
to question the benefits of HDC; it provided hope…and money.7
1. 20/20 Friday: A Betrayal of Hope; Breast Cancer Patients Urged to
Have Bone Marrow Transplants for Money Rather Than Better Health (ABC
television broadcast, Apr. 14, 2001) (statement made by reporter Dr. Timothy
Johnson).
2. HDC treatment requires that patients have bone marrow stem cells
removed from their body and stored prior to receiving extremely high doses of
chemotherapy. National Women’s Health Network, High-Dose Chemotherapy
Debacle Highlights Systemic Weaknesses, 25 NETWORK NEWS 3 (2000). If the
patient survives the chemotherapy regimen, the stem cells are then transplanted back into her body in an effort to restore the bone marrow that was
destroyed by the chemotherapy. Id.
3. Thomas H. Maugh II & Rosie Mestel, Key Breast Cancer Study was a
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at A1.
4. Michelle Marble, Breast Cancer (Therapy): Proven Superiority of High
Dose Chemotherapy for Metastatic Disease, CANCER WEEKLY, Dec. 9, 1996, at
7–8.
5. National Women’s Health Network, supra note 2, at 3.
6. Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, Health Business Thrives on Unproven
Treatment, Leaving Science Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at 1.
7. Id. See also National Women’s Health Network, supra note 2, at 3;
20/20 Friday, supra note 1 (“Doctors knew that high dose had not been defini-
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Dr. Bezwoda repeated his claims again before an international
conference of cancer experts in 1999.8 That is when Dr. Bezwoda’s claims about HDC, and his reputation as a prestigious
cancer researcher, began to fall apart.9 In an effort to discover
why the doctor’s results were so different from other research
projects, several researchers asked to review Dr. Bezwoda’s
clinical trial data.10 In doing so, they discovered that much of
the data used to support HDC’s effectiveness was non-existent
or had been falsified.11 In a 2000 letter to his former employer,
the doctor claimed that he had faked his research results “in a
foolish desire to make the presentation more acceptable.”12
Ensuring the integrity of research projects is an increasingly
prominent topic in the field of medicine.13 In the last few decades, the number of medical research projects has increased
exponentially.14 Paralleling this increase is an expansion in the
geographic locations where research projects are situated, including many new research projects conducted at international
locations.15 The global expansion of medical research has
tively proven to more effective but they were under pressure to continue what
by then was big business.”).
8. Denise Grady, Conference Divided Over High-Dose Breast Cancer
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A19.
9. Id. At the conference, all of the research presented on HDC, except Dr.
Bezwoda’s, showed that the procedure had no benefit for patients. Id. As a
result of this discrepancy, researchers from the United States traveled to
South Africa (where Bezwoda worked at the University of Witwatersrand
Medical School) to review the doctor’s research data. Michael Hagmann, Cancer Researcher Sacked for Alleged Fraud, 287 SCIENCE 1901, 1901 (2000).
Bezwoda was fired by the University shortly thereafter. Id.
10. Hagmann, supra note 9, at 1901
11. Id.; Maugh & Mestel, supra note 3.
12. South Africa: Cancer Professor Was A Serial Fraud, AFRICA NEWS, May
4, 2001. For a further discussion of the implications of Dr. Bezwoda’s scientific misconduct, see Richard Horton, After Bezwoda, 355 LANCET 942, 942–43
(2000).
13. See, e.g., Chris Beyrer & Nancy E. Kass, Human Rights, Politics and
Reviews of Research Ethics, 360 LANCET 246, 246 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Eve E. Slater, IRB Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402 (2002).
Federal funding of medical research has more than doubled since 1995; private sponsorship of research has increase at the same rate. Id.
15. See generally Timothy Caulfield, Globalization, Conflicts of Interest
and Clinical Research: An Overview of Trends and Issues, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP.
J. 31 (2001) (discussing general trends related to the globalization of clinical
research and conflicts of interest).
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prompted many new questions about how to ensure the safety
of human research subjects16 during clinical trials.17 Concerns
involving clinical trials in the United States and abroad focus
on five major areas: appropriateness of research designs;18
proper scientific and ethical review of research proposals;19 reasonableness of participant selection;20 assurance that voluntary
informed consent21 was obtained from all research participants;22
and receipt of appropriate treatment during and after a clinical
trial.23 Debate over the elements of these five topics is likely to

16. 1 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at i (2001) [hereinafter NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH].
17. For the purposes of this Note, a “clinical trial” is defined as the administration of and intervention for diagnosis, treatment, or prevention:
The intervention could be a drug or biologic; a device; a behavioral intervention, such as counseling or education; a procedure, such as surgery, laser treatment, or a diagnostic test; or a specific service, such
as home or hospice care. A clinical trial can be designed and supported for commercial reasons, such as approval of a new drug, or in
response to interest by an individual investigator or research group.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 34 (2002). See also infra Part II.A.
18. Research design includes a complete description of types or levels of
treatment that will be provided to clinical trial participants and how the new
treatment will be compared to existing treatment, if any exists. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 17, at 8–9.
19. Ethical review is conducted by a committee whose purpose is to evaluate whether the proposed research is ethical according to ethical guidelines for
medical research. Id. at 13.
20. This concern relates to whether the choice to conduct a clinical trial
within a particular country or population group is reasonably related to the
population’s health needs. Id. at 7–8.
21. Informed consent is a statutory and common law doctrine that requires
a physician to fully disclose treatment risks and complete details of treatment
procedure to patients before administering a proposed treatment. Shannon
Benbow, Conflict + Interest: Financial Incentives and Informed Consent in
Human Subject Research, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 181, 187
(2003).
22. Concern that cultural issues can impede a participant’s understanding
of the clinical trial and the risks involved in becoming a participant. NBAC
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 11.
23. Id. at 9, 12.
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continue, particularly in light of ever-increasing research budgets and expansion of research into developing countries.24
A vital component of good medical research is analysis of research protocols, by an independent review body, for potential
ethics violations.25 In the United States, most research projects
that involve human participants must be submitted to ethics
review committees, called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs),
for approval.26 Internationally, many nations have their own
regulations providing for ethical review of medical experiments
through agencies and/or committees or groups generally referred to as Research Ethics Committees (RECs).27 IRBs and
RECs are charged with approving or denying research protocols
based upon whether the proposed research is scientifically valid
and whether there are adequate protections to ensure the safety
and well-being of participants.28
Despite their status as the gatekeepers in the conduct of
clinical trials, RECs and IRBs lack uniformity nationally and

24. See, e.g., Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, The Human Subject Trade:
Ethical and Legal Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 398, 401 (2003) (payment of finders fees to physicians for obtaining
research participants for commercial trials may drive physicians to recruit
inappropriate subjects and to be lenient with informed consent procedures);
Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, But Not Good Enough to
Benefit from the Results of that Research: Are the Clinical HIV Vaccine Trials
in Africa Unjust?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127 (2004) (selection of research participants in Africa unjust and unethical because African populations, individual African research participants in particular, do not receive the benefits of
therapies they helped to test); Jeremy Sugarman, Lying, Cheating and Stealing in Clinical Research, 1 CLINICAL TRIALS 475, 475–76 (2004) (discussing the
considerable attention focused on the integrity of clinical research and need
for clear guidance and transparency in situations involving scientific misconduct).
25. NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 5.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2005) (requires IRB approval for all research that
receives government funding). See also, 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2005) (the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) requires that research on new drugs receive approval by an IRB).
27. See Robert J. Levine, Research Ethics Committees, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 2311 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004). Different countries may
use different names, and some emulate the United States by calling their
review committees IRBs, but for the purposes of this Note non-U.S. review
committees will be referred to as RECs.
28. See infra Part III.
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internationally.29 The IRB system in the United States is generally held out to other nations as the best existing format for
ethical review of medical research.30 Despite this distinction,
there are minimal specific regulations or procedures that all
IRBs must follow.31 There is no one set of ethics guidelines that
all review committees must use.32 Each institution that wishes
to establish an ethics review committee is required to develop
many of its own guidelines and operating procedures—resulting
in substantial inconsistency between institutions.33 This problem only increases in magnitude for RECs in other countries
that have less developed regulations and little experience managing ethics issues in medical research.34
In the last several years, one of the most highly publicized
safety issues has been how best to protect participants when
researchers and research institutions have personal interests
that may conflict with their obligation to protect participants’
safety.35 However, despite heavy publicity, only minimal regu-

29. See, e.g., Bernard M. Dickens, The Challenge of Equivalent Protection,
in 2 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A-10
(2001) [hereinafter 2 NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH]. Inconsistency often
leads to conflicting regulations of research conducted at foreign sites, specifically when U.S. regulations are applicable due to U.S. funding or the need for
FDA approval. Id. Determinations of when U.S. regulations are applicable to
a clinical trial is discussed infra Part III and V.
30. Marie Hirtle et al., A Comparative Analysis of Research Ethics Review
Mechanisms and the ICH Good Clinical Practice Guideline, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH
L. 265, 267 (2000). See also INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION
OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR
HUMAN USE, E6 GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE (1996)
[hereinafter ICH GCP] (The ICH Good Clinical Practice guide adopted ERC
provisions almost identical to the Common Rule (infra Part III)), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/959fnl.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
31. See infra Part V.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See DHHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CLINICAL TRIALS: A GROWING CHALLENGE IN PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 15
(2001) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS] (noting that sponsors
of clinical research have concerns about the adequacy of review by RECs in
nations with little experience conducting medical research).
35. See, e.g., Pamela R. Ferguson, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Clinical
Trials: The View of Researchers, 11 MED. L. REV. 48, 51–52 (2003). Conflicts of
interest are discussed in detail in Part IV of this Note.
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latory guidance has occurred.36 Regulatory changes to the mandatory functions of RECs—specifically, changes to U.S. regulations—can minimize the risk of unethical research occurring in
the United States and other nations. International collaboration on development of uniform, internationally-accepted regulations for RECs has been initiated by a few nations, but remains limited.37 Conflict of interest policies implemented in
conjunction with REC oversight can strengthen the ethical review process and promote the purpose of ethical review—
participant safety and well-being.
This Note posits that substantive and procedural weaknesses
in the operations of ethical review committees should be
amended, through revision of U.S. regulations for national and
foreign clinical trials, in order to develop consistent policies for
the management of conflicts of interest and enhance the protection of research participants. Part II provides an overview of
bioethics and clinical trials, including several influential ethics
guidelines that have directed post-World War II medical research. Part III gives a general overview of ethical review
committees in the United States and abroad. This Part includes information on the different control mechanisms used
within the United States to regulate IRBs. This Part also examines control mechanisms for RECs in other countries. Part
IV investigates the issue of conflict of interest as it relates to
medical research and clinical trials at the national and international level. Part V proposes regulatory solutions to clarify the
role of IRBs and RECs and ameliorate deficiencies that currently exist in the regulation of conflicts of interest. Specifically,
this Part suggests several regulatory changes that, if implemented, have the potential to increase national and international ethical review committees’ ability to fulfill their purpose
of ensuring participant safety by providing them with all the
information important for evaluating research proposals.
II. BIOETHICS
Historically, many cultural groups believed that illness
stemmed from violations of social or natural law, and that the
methods of the healer must be “right” and “good” in order to
36. See infra Part V.
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
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return health to the sick person.38 Over the last twenty-five
centuries, ethics in Western countries has been consistently
linked to the moral beliefs of Western society.39 Bioethics is the
study and evaluation of the moral duties, obligations and principles governing the actions of individuals and groups within
the medical field.40 The term “bioethics” was originally coined
by a Wisconsin cancer researcher and was intended to encompass the ethical review of all biological sciences, such as ecology,
agriculture and medicine.41 However, the term “bioethics” is
now synonymous with biomedical ethics and generally only covers issues in biomedical research, medicine and health care.42
The study and practice of bioethics includes a variety of professional backgrounds—including philosophers, theologians, attorneys, clinicians, and researchers—with each providing a unique
perspective on the moral obligations of caregivers and researchers toward patients.43
The import of bioethics has continued to grow over the last
few decades, reflecting the vast increase and complexity of modern medical advances and the policy questions those advances
raise for governments, medical professionals, and the public.44
In the United States, the field of bioethics developed into a major area of academic discourse following revelations of several
highly questionable research experiments during the late 1960s
and early 1970s,45 including the infamous Tuskegee syphilis
38. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 5–6 (1998).
39. Id. at 6.
40. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 10
(2002).
41. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY—BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (1993) [hereinafter OTA
BIOMEDICAL PAPER] (Report # OTA-BP-BBS-1O5), available at http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk1/1993/9312/9312.
PDF (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). The term “bioethics” was coined by Van
Rensselaer Potter (1911-2001), a biochemist who worked as a professor of
oncology at the University of Wisconsin. Id. at 2 (citing VAN RENSSELAER
POTTER, BIOETHICS: BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE (1971)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Publicity surrounding cloning, euthanasia, stem-cell research, and
other new medical advances has increased public awareness of bioethical issues, which in turn has lead to increased governmental regulations and guidelines. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 35, at 52–54.
45. OTA BIOMEDICAL PAPER, supra note 41, at 2.
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study46 and government–sponsored radiation experiments.47
Modern bioethical topics are varied and include such issues as

46. See, e.g., Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS (Susan M. Reverby ed.,
2000). For forty years, between 1932 and 1972, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) conducted an experiment on 400 black men with late stage syphilis. Id. at 15. These men, for the most part illiterate sharecroppers from
Macon County in Alabama, were never told what disease they were suffering
from or of its seriousness. Id. at 18, 21. As a means to enroll participants, the
research subjects were told they would be treated for “bad blood,” the local
term used to describe syphilis. Id. at 22. However, doctors never intended to
cure the men’s syphilis, but rather intended to withhold all forms of treatment
so they could analyze the natural progression of syphilis over time. Id. at 18.
The experiment’s data was to be collected from autopsies of research subjects,
and thus the men were deliberately left to degenerate under the ravages of
tertiary syphilis, which can include tumors, heart disease, paralysis, blindness, insanity, and death. Id. at 23. “As I see it,” one of the doctors involved
explained, “we have no further interest in these patients until they die.” Id.
Researchers continued to withhold treatment for the men throughout the forty
years of the study. Id. at 25. The men were prevented from participating in
several nationwide campaigns to eradicate venereal disease. Id. at 26. When
penicillin was discovered in the 1940s—the first real cure for syphilis—the
Tuskegee men were deliberately denied the medication. Id. at 27. By the end
of the experiment, twenty-eight of the men had died directly of syphilis and
more than one hundred were dead of related complications. Id. at 15.
47. See generally OFFICE OF HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ROADMAP TO THE STORY AND THE RECORDS (1995), available at http:
//tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/roadmap/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
From 1945 until 1974, the U.S. government funded multiple research projects
on the effects of radioactive substances on the human body. Id. Patients were
injected with varying doses of uranium, plutonium, and other radioactive
elements to determine the physiological effects these substances have on the
body. Id. These experiments took place throughout the country and were run
by government agencies, the military, as well as publicly-funded hospitals and
other research programs. Id. Unlike the vast majority of medical research
projects, federally-funded human radiation experiments were deemed “classified,” and all procedures and results were held in secret by the U.S. Government. Id. As a result, decisions on proper conduct of research by higher authorities were never shared with the personnel actually conducting the experiments and there was little to no guidance to researchers on what ethical
guidelines should have been followed. Id. The records on these experiments,
since de-classified, suggest that many research participants did not consent to
being a part of the radiation experiments. Id. Additionally, there is substantial question as to the value of some of the treatment protocols undergone by
participants, i.e. some experiments were done to further scientific knowledge
rather than to provide an form of treatment to the patient. Id.
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abortion, euthanasia, organ transplantation, cloning and stemcell research.48
A. Clinical Trials
This Note will focus solely upon one of the many topics that
fall within the field of bioethics, the ethics of clinical trials conducted with human participants. To better understand the ethics that are applied to clinical trials, it is important to understand the trials process. First, it is important to note that there
are several different types of clinical trials, each having a different objective.49 Many clinical trials have treatment objectives
and test new drugs, medical devices or surgical therapies.50
Other types of trials include prevention trials, diagnostic trials,
screening trials and quality of life trials.51 This Note will focus
its attention upon the process involved in treatment trials.
A second important fact is that clinical trials occur in a series
of progressive steps, with each step building upon the information learned in the previous step.52 The first step in the clinical
trials process is to determine whether the new drug compound
or other product is safe for use with humans.53 This part of the

48. OTA BIOMEDICAL PAPER, supra note 41, at 2–3.
49. National Library of Medicine, An Introduction to Clinical Trials, ClinicalTrials.gov website, at http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct/info/whatis;jsessionid=EA
61A759F5AD0B1BF685C3714332AD76 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
50. Id. Treatment trials generally look at “experimental treatments, new
combinations of drugs, or new approaches to surgery or radiation therapy.”
Id.
51. Id. Prevention trials are aimed at increasing our ability to prevent
occurrence or recurrence of disease. Id. Diagnostic trials are designed to improve a medicine’s ability to diagnose a particular disease or condition
through improved testing or medical procedures. Id. Screening trials seek
new or better ways to detect diseases or other medical conditions. Id. Quality
of Life trials, also known as Supportive Care trials, are intended to improve
the quality of life for patients who suffer chronic illnesses. Id.
52. See, e.g., CenterWatch, Free Research Information, Books & Publications, CenterWatch Clinical Trials Listing Service, at http://www.center
watch.com/bookstore/freeresearch.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) (discussing
the phases of clinical testing that normally occur with experimental drugs).
53. See, e.g., International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on
General Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,113, 66,115 (Dec.
17, 1997) (guidance published by the FDA setting forth general scientific principles for the conduct, performance and control of clinical trials).
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process is called pre-clinical research (or non-clinical studies).54
After a new product has been developed, it must be tested on
two or more non-human species of animals (one rodent, one
non-rodent) to determine if it is safe to give the same product to
humans.55 These safety evaluations are important for determining whether the product can be used at all, or whether specific
limitations should be placed upon the product’s use in humans.56
This initial step can take a few weeks to several years.57
Once pre-clinical research has shown that a product can be
safely58 tested on humans, the clinical trial process begins in
earnest. The steps in the clinical trial process are often referred

54. See, e.g., id.; CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD &
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CDER HANDBOOK 5 (1998) [hereinafter CDER
HANDBOOK] (includes chapter on the processes involved in new drug development and review), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2005).
55. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 6. Testing must be done on more
than one species because different species may have different reactions to the
product. Id. For pharmaceuticals, non-clinical studies usually include: “single
and repeated dose toxicity studies, reproduction toxicity studies, genotoxicity
studies, local tolerance studies, and for drugs that have special cause for concern or are intended for a long duration of use, an assessment of carcinogenic
potential.” INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: M3 NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN
CLINICAL TRIALS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 2 (1997) [hereinafter ICH
NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES]. Other studies include pharmacology safety
assessments and studies on absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion (pharmacokinetics). Id.
56. See, e.g., ICH NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES, supra note 55, at 2. For a
pharmaceutical product:
The goals of the nonclinical safety evaluation include: a characterization of the toxic effects with respect to target organs, dose dependence, relationship to exposure, and potential reversibility. This information is important for the estimation of an initial safe starting
dose for the human trials and the identification of parameters for
clinical monitoring of potential adverse effects.
Id.
57. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 6.
58. The fact that a product has been deemed safe to test on humans does
not mean that research participants are not at risk for adverse effects. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at Risks. Rather, it means that the
data from pre-clinical research shows that the risks are low and that the proposed benefit of the product outweighs any potential risk. CDER HANDBOOK,
supra note 54, at 7.

File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc

770

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:54 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM

[Vol. 30:2

to as “phases,” though labels differ in different regions.59 Clinical trials of new drugs, one of the most common types of treatment trials, provide a good example of trial phases. The initial
testing of the product on humans, called Phase I trials, are conducted with a small group of volunteers.60 Phase I trials are
used to identify side effects, support earlier determinations that
the product is safe for human use, and to find a safe dosage
range.61 Once the process moves on to Phase II trials, the number of participants expands (generally 100–300 people) and researchers do further evaluations of effectiveness and safety.62
Phase II trials are usually the initial stage where the product is
tested on individuals who have the disease or medical condition
that the product is designed to treat.63 The number of people
that the product is tested on increases into the thousands for
Phase III trials.64 Phase III trials are often used to compare a
new treatment to existing treatments, to monitor side effects,
and to confirm effectiveness of the product for its intended purpose.65 After the conclusion of Phase III trials, a product that
has proven itself safe and effective is generally approved for
sale to the public.66

59. See, e.g., CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8–9; International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on General Considerations for Clinical
Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,115–66,117.
60. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of
Clinical Trials?. Initial testing is generally done on a group of twenty to
eighty volunteers. Id. Volunteers in Phase I trials may be patients; however,
they are usually healthy individuals. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8.
61. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of
Clinical Trials?.
62. Id.
63. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8.
64. Id. at 9.
65. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of
Clinical Trials?.
66. See, e.g., International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on
General Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,117. Further
testing of the product often occurs after it has been marketed to the public.
Id. These tests, known as Phase IV trials, are not considered necessary for
approval of the product but may be important for making further determinations of the best dosage and optimizing the product’s use. Id.
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B. Ethics in Human-Subject Clinical Trials
One of the first questions many clinical trial participants ask
is: “Is someone going to make sure that my safety is protected?”67 To protect the safety and well-being of clinical trial
participants, all research done on human-subjects is governed
by one or more ethical codes.68 One of the first texts dealing directly with ethics in medical practice was written in 1803.69
Medical Ethics, written by the English physician Thomas Percival, covered traditional medical decorum regarding physicians’ relations with their patients, as well as physicianphysician relationships.70 Percival believed adherence to proper
ethical decorum would render the profession worthy of the public’s trust.71 Ethics as a guide to decorum continued through the
1940s; however, medical ethics changed significantly in the
decades following World War II.72 The following sections discuss
the post-World War II documents on ethics in medical research
that have been most widely accepted by the international community.
1. Internationally-Recognized Ethics Guidelines—
1940 to 1980
a. Nuremberg Code
While medical research on humans is nothing new, the horrific experiments conducted on prisoners in Nazi concentration
camps pushed ethics to the forefront of research discussions.73
In United States v. Brandt, the first case heard before the Military Tribunal on War Crimes at Nuremberg, often referred to as
the “Medicine Case,” ten criteria for ethical and humane treat67. See, e.g., National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at How is the
Safety of Participants Protected?.
68. Id.
69. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 7.
70. Id. Physician were to be comforting, firm, gentle and discrete with
patients. Id. Physician-physician relationships refers to the professional
manner in which physicians are expected to interact with one another, in
particular the showing of respect between colleagues. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11. One known exception to this general assertion is a 1900 book
vilifying unethical Russian experimentation. Id.
73. See, e.g., Benbow, supra note 21, at 185–86.
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ment of research subjects were outlined as part of the final
judgment.74 Those ten criteria became known as the Nuremberg
Code (Code),75 one of the most cited codes for ethical research.76
Analysis of the Code requires some knowledge of the Medicine Case and the experiments that were its core. The Medicine
Case was conducted under U.S. military auspices at the Palace
for Justice in Nuremberg, Germany.77 Twenty-three defendants, all physicians but one, were tried by the tribunal; seven
were sentenced to death for war crimes and crimes against humanity.78 The research done by the Nazi physicians included
74. The Medicine Case, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at
181–82 (1949).
75. The ten principles laid out by the court in its final ruling, later called
the Nuremberg Code, were held by the military tribunal as the minimum
necessary to satisfy moral, legal and ethical responsibilities. Id. The primary
emphasis of the Code was voluntary consent:
[P]ersons involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should
be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected;
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come
from his participation in the experiment.
Id. The other nine tenets of the Code directed that experiments were to be
conducted only for the good of society, they needed to be unprocurable by other
methods or means of study, and must not be random or unnecessary. Id.
Physical and mental suffering and injury to research participants was to be
avoided. Id. Researchers were not to conduct any experiments that they believed may lead to the death or disabling of research participants. Id. The
degree of risk to research participants was never to exceed that determined by
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment,
i.e., if the risk to participants was high, then the gain to society from the experiment must also be very high. Id. As well, experiments were only to be
conducted by qualified scientific personnel who could ensure that the “highest
degree of skill and care” would be used during all stages of an experiment. Id.
76. Beyrer & Kass, supra note 13, at 247.
77. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 4 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter NAZI DOCTORS].
78. Id.
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both war-related and non-war-related activities.79 Research
subjects were given no choice about their participation, nor
were they given any choice in any matters affecting their health
and well-being. Subjects were selected from prisoners in the
concentration camps—men, women and children—by soldiers or
physicians without being told what was going to happen to
them.80 The research subjects endured extremely painful and
denigrating experiments.81 Many research subjects died.82
79. See generally Eva Mozes-Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experimentation: A Personal Account, in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 77, at 54. The
author and her twin sister were research subjects used by Dr. Josef Mengele
at the Birkenau concentration camp. Id. Mengele considered twins the perfect research subjects; one child to experiment upon and one child to act as the
control. Id. Mengele used the twins for two research programs: one program
dealing with genetics and the other dealing with germ warfare. Id. at 55. The
germ warfare experiments consisted of injecting one twin with a biological
agent used for germ warfare. Id. When the child died from the injected
agent, his or her twin was then killed in order for the doctors to compare the
infected versus healthy organs of the two children at autopsy. Id. at 56.
Cross-transfusions and castrations were performed on twins to determine if
an individual’s sex was interchangeable, as well as other experiments to determine how the human body could be manipulated—including experiments to
determine how much blood children could have removed from their body before they died. Id. at 57. Genetic experiments on individuals with physical
abnormalities or defects were performed to determine causation. Id. Dr.
Mengele’s genetic experiments were particularly focused on means to “purify”
the Aryan race. Id.
80. Id. at 55–58.
81. Telford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946,
in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 77, at 67. The U.S. prosecutor’s opening statement provided a detailed description of twelve research activities for the court
to consider as crimes against humanity. Id. at 70–85. The experiments included high-altitude experiments in which prisoners were provided with gas
masks and placed in a chamber that was pressurized to simulate high altitude
(one experiment used pressure for an elevation of 47,000 feet); once the chamber was fully pressurized, the gasmask was removed and the reactions of prisoners were observed until they died. Id. at 70–72. The subjects died in excruciating pain in a process that took more than half an hour. Id. The researchers joked in their communiqués that any subject who survived the experiments should be pardoned to life in prison. Id. The freezing experiments
required prisoners to stand naked outside in freezing temperatures for nine to
fourteen hours or to sit in tanks of iced water for three or more hours. Id. at
73. In the mustard gas experiments, researchers intentionally wounded prisoners and then the wounds were infected with mustard gas. Id. at 75–76.
Other subjects were forced to inhale mustard gas, swallow it in liquid form, or
were injected with the liquid form. Id at 77. One of the most extensive experiments was on sterilization. Id. at 82–85. The sterilization experiments
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As a result of these atrocities, the Code focused upon protections that would clearly enunciate that the Nazi experiments
were unethical. Therefore, the primary tenet of the Code is voluntary informed consent of research participants: “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the persons…should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion.”83 The Code also emphasizes that research participants rights and well-being must be
protected.84 The Nuremberg Code, heavily influenced by the
United States,85 became the stepping stone to the ethics guidelines used in medical research throughout the world today.

b. Declaration of Helsinki
The World Medical Association (WMA) is an international
not-for-profit organization founded in 1947 to represent physicians around the world.86 In the summer of 1964 in Helsinki,
Finland, the WMA officially adopted the “Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.”87 This document,
known as the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration), is the most
influential international protocol to emerge since the Nuremwere developed to find an inexpensive and quick method of sterilization that
could be used “to wipe out Russians, Poles, Jews,” and other undesirables. Id.
Sterilization techniques included injection with test drugs, surgical castration,
and high-dose radiation through X-rays to the genitals. Id. Nazi doctors also
conducted experiments with malaria, Sulfanilamide, drinking sea-water, infection with typhus, epidemic jaundice, poisoning with various poisons, and
experiments in which prisoners were intentional burned with the chemicals
from English incendiary bombs. Id. at 70–85.
82. Id. at 70–85.
83. The Medicine Case, supra note 74, at 181.
84. Id.
85. The U.S. government and the American Medical Association (AMA)
heavily influenced the Code. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 135. Specifically, the
language of the Nuremberg Code was drawn from an ethics report to the AMA
by Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, the man later chosen by the United States to act as the
prosecution’s medical expert during the trial. Id.
86. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ABOUT THE WMA, at http://www.wma.
net/e/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
87. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1989) [hereinafter 1989 DECLARATION].
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berg trials.88 The Declaration’s introduction heavily emphasized
that the primary duty and obligation of all physicians is the
health and welfare of patients.89 The Declaration also emphasizes that the only legitimate purpose of biomedical research
involving human subjects is to “improve diagnostic, therapeutic
and prophylactic procedures and the understanding of the aetiology and pathogenesis of disease.”90 One of the most noticeable
stylistic differences between the Code and the Declaration is the
placement of informed consent guidelines. Unlike the Code, the
Declaration places informed consent in the middle of the document rather than as the primary tenet.91 The difference reflects
the Declaration authors’ belief that “the essence of research ethics is the integrity and vigilance of the investigator.”92
Since its adoption in 1964, the Declaration of Helsinki has
been amended five times.93 The Declaration of Helsinki was
substantially revised in 197594 from five to twelve basic guiding
principals for ensuring ethical research.95 It was amended

88. John Harris, Research on Human Subjects, Exploitation, and Global
Principles of Ethics, in 3 LAW AND MEDICINE 379, 384 (2000).
89. The Declaration begins by declaring that,
[i]t is the mission of the physician to safeguard the health of the people. His or her knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfillment of this mission…The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Assembly binds the physician with the words, “The health of my
patient will be my first consideration,” and the International Code of
Medical Ethics declares that, “A physician shall act only in the patient’s interest when providing medical care which might have the effect of weakening the physical and mental condition of the patient.”
1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87.
90. Id. Aetiology is defined as “the cause of a disease.” Webster’s Online
Dictionary, at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org (last visited Feb. 5,
2005). Pathogenesis is the origin or development of a disease. Id.
91. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 136.
92. Id.
93. 1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87.
94. Heidi P. Forster et al., The 2000 Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki:
A Step Forward or More Confusion, 358 LANCET 1449, 1449 (2001).
95. Rebecca A. Finkenbinder, Comment, New Recommendations on International Research: Can Minimum Standards Prevent the Exploitation of Vulnerable Human Subjects in Developing Countries?, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV.
363, 373 (2003).
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again in 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000.96 The Declaration’s 1983
and 1989 versions are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations for the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA).97
The 2000 revision of the Declaration includes the most substantial revisions since the 1975 amendment.98 These revisions have
been highly criticized due to the hasty passage of the new Declaration and because of the controversial nature of several additions.99 Currently, the FDA has declined to include the 2000
Declaration in its regulations and has retained the 1989 version.100 Part V of this Note discusses specific provisions within
the 2000 Declaration in further detail.

c. Belmont Report
The majority of modern bioethics guidelines have been created by international committees; however, the guidelines formulated specifically for U.S. researchers have been highly influential at the international level. The National Research Act
(Act) was signed into law by President Nixon in July 1974.101
The Act was the first U.S. legislation to include medical ethics
principles as a regulatory mechanism for controlling and sanctioning behavior.102 The legislation promulgated by the Act cov96. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2000) [hereinafter 2000 DECLARATION].
97. 21 C.F.R. 312.120(c)(4) (codifies 1989 Declaration for foreign clinical
trials of new drugs); 21 C.F.R. 814.15(b) (codifies 1983 Declaration for foreign
trials of medical devices).
98. Forster, supra note 94, at 1449.
99. Only two weeks were made available for comments on the proposed
revisions before the assembly voted. Id. Some of the new additions included
requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest, expansion of the definition of vulnerable populations that necessitate special protections, and a requirement
that research participants be assured access to best proven methods of treatment identified by the study. Id.
100. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL
STUDIES 2 (2001) [hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE REPORT], available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clinical031301.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
The FDA report did not explain why the revised Declaration was not implemented other than to note that the agency was reviewing its regulations to
determine whether changes were necessary. Id.
101. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-348, § 201, 88 Stat. 342
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
102. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 99.
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ers all biomedical research performed by individual researchers
or institutions that receive federal funding for their work.103
Additionally, the Act created the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (National Commission).104 One of the mandates for the
National Commission was to “identify the ethical principles
which should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral
research with human subjects and develop guidelines that
should be followed in such research.”105
Despite the existence of internationally-accepted bioethics
guidelines, such as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki, the National Commission determined that ethical
guidelines of the time did not have sufficient depth.106 The National Commission therefore commenced a series of meetings
that culminated in the publication of the Belmont Report in
April 1979.107 The Belmont Report contained the National
Commission’s recommendations for ethical principles that
should be used by researchers and institutions receiving federal
funding.108
The Belmont Report was designed as a general policy statement that provides a basic framework for discussions on biomedical research ethics.109 The National Commission determined that ethical research on human subjects included three
overriding principles: respect for persons, beneficence and justice.110 Respect for persons incorporates protection for the
autonomy of individuals and protections for individuals with
103. Id.
104. National Research Act § 201.
105. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 102 (quoting National Research Act of 1974).
106. Id. The authors of the Belmont Report also determined that the Nuremberg Code and the 1975 Declaration of Helsinki were often inadequate to
cover complex situations and at times were in conflict with one another.
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH 3 (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], available at http://
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/04/briefing/20044066b1_22_Belmont%20Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
107. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 102.
108. DENNIS M. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 20 (1984).
109. Id. at 21.
110. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 106, at Basic Ethical Principles.
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diminished autonomy.111 The regulatory structure that insures
respect for persons is informed consent.112 Beneficence is the
obligation placed upon researchers to “(1) do no harm and (2)
maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms” to
participants.113 The application of the beneficence principal is
exemplified by thoughtful and thorough assessment of the risks
and benefits associated with proposed research by investigators
and IRBs/RECs.114 The final overriding principal of ethical re111. Id. In discussing the respect for persons, the National Commission
defined an autonomous individual as a person “capable of deliberation about
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.” Id.
Respect for individual autonomy recognizes the rights of individuals to have
opinions and to make their own choices, so long as there is no detriment to
others. Id. Individuals with diminished autonomy are children, those who
have been incapacitated by physical or mental illness, or those whose liberty
is severely limited (generally, prisoners). Id.
112. Id. at Applications. The application of respect for persons was broken
down into three necessary requirements for informed consent: information,
comprehension and voluntariness. Id. “Information” requires that individuals are provided sufficient information to make an informed opinion and
choices about participation in a research project. Id. Sufficient information
generally includes: research procedure, purpose of the research, anticipated
benefits and potential risks, alternative procedures or treatments available,
and “a statement offering the subject the opportunity to ask questions and to
withdraw at any time from the research.” Id.
113. Id. at Basic Ethical Principles. The National Commission noted that
this principle extends to the entire enterprise of research, and thereby places
an obligation on society at large as well as on individual researchers. Id. It
was also noted that there are some inherent difficulties in implementation.
Id. It is difficult to avoid harm when researchers are often unaware of potential harms. Id. It is normal in research for there to be some risk of harm to
participants; the difficulty for individuals and society lies in determining what
constitutes a justifiable risk. Id.
114. Id. at Applications. Risk/Benefit assessment requires that researchers
carefully sift through all existing, relevant data to determine potential risks
and to evaluate alternative methods of obtaining the same benefits sought in
the research. Id. Risk/benefit analysis is a means of examining the design of
proposed research and to evaluate whether risks inherent to the research are
justifiable. Id. Justifiability of research must, at minimum, reflect the following:
(i) Brutal or inhumane treatment of human subjects is never morally
justified…. (ii) Risks should be reduced to those necessary to achieve
the research objective…. (iii) When research involves significant risk
of serious impairment, review committees should be extraordinarily
insistent on the justification of the risk…. (iv) When vulnerable
populations are involved in research, the appropriateness of involving
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search is justice.115 Justice revolves around the concept of equal
distributions of burdens and benefits.116 Application of the justice principal results in the development of fair procedures and
outcomes in the selection of research participants.117 Despite
being written almost thirty years ago, the Belmont Report retains substantial influence on U.S. research policy and later
international ethics guides.118
2. Internationally-Recognized Ethics Guidelines—
1980 to Present

a. CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) is an international nongovernmental organization founded in 1949 under the auspices of the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Sci-

them should itself be demonstrated…. (v) Relevant risks and benefits
must be thoroughly arrayed in documents and procedures used in the
informed consent process.
Id.
115. Id. at Basic Ethical Principles.
116. Id. The burden of research, the risks to individual participants, should
not fall unfairly or unequally on any one group or population of people. Id.
Additionally, the benefits derived from research, new techniques, or drugs
should not go unequally to financially or socially advantaged groups or populations. Id.
117. Id. at Applications. Both social and individual justice are relevant to
the discussion of equitable selection of research participants. Id. Individual
justice requires fairness and unbiased selection of participants. Id. Social
justice requires awareness of those who should or should not be allowed to
participate in research based on a person’s ability to bear burdens or on the
appropriateness of potentially increasing the burden on an already burdened
class of individuals. Id.
118. MALONEY, supra note 108, at 20. A direct example of this influence can
be found in the CIOMS Guidelines, infra Part II.B.2.i. The CIOMS Guidelines
specifically identify the three overriding principles of the Belmont Report as
the ethical principles that were foundational to the CIOMS Guidelines.
COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES,
INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS, at General Ethical Principles (2002) [hereinafter CIOMS
Guidelines], available at http://www.cioms.ch/frame_guidelines_nov_2002.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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entific and Cultural and Organization (UNECO).119 CIOMS began its work on ethics in biomedical research in the late
1970s.120 The goal of the organization was to create a set of
guidelines that would “indicate how the ethical principles that
should guide the conduct of biomedical research involving human subjects, as set for the in the Declaration of Helsinki, could
be effectively applied, particularly in developing countries,
given their socioeconomic circumstances, laws and regulations,
and executive and administrative arrangements.”121
Several bioethical documents regarding medical research
have been created by CIOMS. In 1982, CIOMS, in collaboration
with WHO, published Proposed International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (Proposed Guidelines).122 Proposed Guidelines was the first document specifically designed to help countries, developing countries in particular, effectively apply the ethical guidelines in the
Declaration to their existing socio-political structure.123 In 1993,
revision of the Proposed Guidelines resulted in publication of
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.124 Rapid changes in medical research—including the increased use of controlled clinical trials
in developing countries, funded and conducted by external
sponsors and investigators—required that the document receive
further amendment.125 The revised International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects was
published in 2002 (2002 Guidelines).126
The 2002 Guidelines were heavily reviewed and influenced by
the international community. Extensive opportunities for input
by members of the international bioethics debate were provided
over the four years, from 1998 to 2002, during which the revised
119. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118, at Background.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Proposed Guidelines was created prior to the outbreak of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic and the subsequent large-scale research trials that were
required to deal with HIV/AIDS. Id. It was specifically targeted toward protection of research participants in developing nations who were involved in
traditional small-scale, publicly-funded research protocols. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See infra Part I.
126. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118, at Background.
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guidelines were produced.127 The final redrafting committee included experts in ethics and research from every continent.128
The 2002 Guidelines, like the Belmont Report in the United
States, emphasize three overarching ethical principles: respect
for persons, 129 beneficence, 130 and justice.131 Unlike the Declaration of Helsinki, which includes broad, generalized principles,
the 2002 Guidelines include extensive commentary designed to
highlight the specific issues that have been discussed in academia regarding each guideline.
The 2002 Guidelines include twenty-one ethics guidelines for
biomedical research at the international level.132 Unlike the
primacy of informed consent in the Code, the primary tenet of
the 2002 Guidelines aligns the guidelines with the Declaration
by requiring a showing of ethical and scientific justification for
all research.133 Guidelines on informed consent are numerous
and detailed, but do not begin until Guideline 4.134 Guidelines 2
and 3 relate to ethical review of research and will be discussed
in further detail in Part V of this Note. The 2002 Guidelines
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Respect for persons includes respect for individual autonomy in making
personal choices, as well as protection of persons with impaired or diminished
autonomy. Id. at General Ethical Principles.
130. Beneficence is the “ethical obligation to maximize benefits and to
minimize harms.” Id.
131. Justice primarily refers of “distributive justice,” which requires equitable distribution of burdens and benefits. Id.
132. Id. at Guidelines.
133. Id. Guideline 1 specifies:
The ethical justification of biomedical research involving human subjects is the prospect of discovering new ways of benefiting people’s
[sic] health. Such research can be ethically justifiable only if it is carried out in ways that respect and protect, and are fair to, the subjects
of that research and are morally acceptable within the communities
in which the research is carried out. Moreover, because scientifically
invalid research is unethical in that it exposes research subjects to
risk without possible benefit, investigators and sponsors must ensure
that proposed studies involving human subjects conform to generally
accepted scientific principles and are based on adequate knowledge of
the pertinent scientific literature.
Id.
134. Id. Informed consent is at issue in Guidelines 4–6; consent issues with
those unable to give full, informed consent are covered in Guidelines 9, 14
(children), and 15 (mental/behavioral disorders). Id.
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also include specific provisions for dealing with vulnerable
populations135 and a controversial “choice of control” guideline.136
The specific focus of the 2002 Guidelines on medical research
conducted at the international level makes this document particularly valuable to investigators, sponsors, and host countries
wishing to ensure the ethical soundness of their research programs.

b. International Conference on Harmonization’s Good Clinical
Practices
The substantial increase in regulations and guidelines directed at clinical research during the 1960s and 1970s coincided
with expansion of the pharmaceutical industry into the global
marketplace.137 Despite common regulatory goals of assuring
quality, safety and efficacy of new drugs, the specific technical
135. Id. Vulnerable populations generally include prisoners, minorities, the
mentally ill, the hopelessly ill, poor people and children. ADIL E. SHAMOO &
DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 184 (2003).
136. Id. at Guidelines. “Choice of control” generally refers to the type of
treatment that a member of the control group in an experiment will receive.
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, The Globalization of Health Law: The Case of Permissibility of Placebo-based Research, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (2000). Considerable debate in bioethical circles is currently focused on the use of placebocontrol studies. Id. A placebo is generally an inert substance given to a research participant in lieu of the treatment being received by the non-control
group. Id. at 176. The debate around the use of placebo-control studies is
particularly vociferous in research experiments that test drugs or procedures
responsive to harms that already have alternative methods of treatment. Id.
at 177. The question oft being: is it ethical to deny a known, proven treatment
to any participant, even if that treatment would be unavailable to the participant outside of the research experiment? See, e.g., Finkenbinder, supra note
95.
137. See ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, INFORMATION BROCHURE 3–4
(2001) [hereinafter ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE], available at http://
www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=410&@_MODE=GLB (last visited Jan.
31, 2005). In its 2004 annual report, PhRMA, the largest U.S. association of
pharmaceutical companies involved in research and development, stated that
its members’ research and development expenditures abroad increased by fifty
times in the last thirty years.
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2004, at 39
(2004) [hereinafter PhRMA 2004 PROFILE], available at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/publications//2004-03-31.937.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
Additionally, the increase in research and development spending abroad outpaced domestic spending by more than 1000% over the same period. Id.
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requirements that a drug needed to meet prior to approval for
sale to the public varied substantially between countries.138 As a
result, the pharmaceutical industry was required to repeat
time-consuming and expensive clinical trials139 in each country
in which they wanted to sell their drugs.140 As a response to the
growing globalization of the pharmaceutical industry and the
regulatory burdens that new drugs faced when introduced to
various countries’ markets, many began to call for international
harmonization of regulatory requirements.141
The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was established in 1990.142 The ICH is a joint
initiative by regulators and industry in the three nations that
138. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4.
139. For example, in the United States, a new drug compound generally
takes over ten years to proceed from the preclinical stage to approval for marketing at a cost of approximately $800 million. See, e.g., No New Drugs, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 2003, at A10; PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 2 (average new drug takes ten to fifteen years to get to market and costs approximately $800 million to develop).
140. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4. Repetition of clinical trials was burdening pharmaceutical companies’ research & development
budgets, impacting the overall cost of health care, and creating substantial
delay in bringing safe and efficacious new treatments to patients. Id.
141. Official Website for the International Conference on Harmonization,
History and Future of ICH, at http://www.ich.org/UrlGrpServer.jser?@_ID=
276&@_TEMPLATE=254 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). Initial harmonization of
regulatory requirements was done by the European Community (now the
European Union) in the 1980s. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137,
at 4. See also David Vogel, The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Regulation,
11 GOVERNANCE 1, 3–5 (1998). The desire to harmonize was expressed in diplomatic discussions between Europe, Japan and the United States during the
same period. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4. However,
specific plans for action were not initiated until the 1989 WHO Conference on
Drug Regulatory Authorities in Paris. Id. The planning at the WHO conference led to discussions between the authorities and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), which later
hosted the first ICH meeting. Id.
142. ICH Steering Committee, Statement by the ICH Steering Committee
on the Occasion of the Fourth International Conference on Harmonization
(July 16–18, 1997), available at http://www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=3
48&@_MODE=GLB. A similar harmonization organization has been formed
for the medical device sector, called the Global Harmonization Task Force, but
this project is less formalized and is in an earlier stage of development than
the ICH. D. B. Jefferys, The Regulation of Medical Devices and the Role of the
Medical Devices Agency, 52 BRIT. J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY 229, 233–34 (2001).
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dominate the development of new pharmaceutical products: the
United States, Japan and the European Union.143 The primary
objective of the ICH is to:
[I]ncrease international harmonization of technical requirements to ensure that safe, effective and high quality medicines
are developed and registered in the most efficient and costeffective manner … [in order to] promote public health, prevent unnecessary duplication of clinical trials in humans, and
minimize the use of animal testing without compromising
144
safety and effectiveness.

To further this objective, harmonization projects have focused
on four categories: Safety,145 Quality,146 Efficacy,147 and a Multidisciplinary category for topics that do not fit nicely in the other
categories.148 One of the most widely-recognized products of the
ICH, published in 1996, is the ICH Good Clinical Practices
guidelines (GCP) for conducting clinical research.149
Unlike the previous guidelines, the ICH GCP is not focused
solely upon ethical considerations in clinical research. Rather,
the GCP is a technical document that includes guidance on the
143. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 6. The ICH has six
official parties, as well as observers whose participation is intended to act as a
link to non-ICH nations. Id. The regulatory agencies involved in the ICH
include the European Commission (European Union), the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare (Japan) and the FDA (United States). Id. at 6–7. Industry
representation is provided by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and PhRMA. Id. at 6–8. The observers to the ICH are Canada (represented by Health Canada), the European Free Trade Area (represented by
Swissmedic Switzerland) and the World Health Organization. Id. at 8. Additionally, the ICH Secretariat is run by the IFPMA. Id. The IFPMA represents prescription drug manufacturers and the research-based pharmaceutical industry in fifty-six countries. Official Website for the International Conference on Harmonization, Structure of the ICH, at http://www.ich.org/UrlGrp
Server.jser?@_ID=276&@_TEMPLATE=254 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
144. ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT ICH 5
(2000), available at http://www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=406&@_MODE
=GLB (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
145. Safety topics are concerned with conduct and practice in pre-clinical
research studies. Id. at 7.
146. Quality topics relate to chemistry, product controls and product manufacturing. Id.
147. Efficacy topics cover the conduct and reporting of clinical trials. Id.
148. Id.
149. See generally ICH GCP, supra note 30.
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development of a research protocol, scientific considerations and
documentary requirements, as well as ethical considerations in
the testing of new pharmaceutical products.150 Though the ICH
focuses upon issues pertaining to pharmaceutical products, the
GCP can be applied to all clinical investigations that use human
subjects.151 The GCP provides thirteen principles intended to
ensure the safety of participants and production of accurate
data from clinical trials.152 The first GCP principle states that
“[c]linical trials should be conducted in accordance with the
ethical principles that have their origin in the Declaration of
Helsinki, and that are consistent with the GCP and the applicable regulatory requirement(s).”153 In particular, ethical review
by an independent review committee154 and informed consent by
participants are emphasized.155 The influence of the ICH GCP
on regulations affecting clinical trials has been substantial in
many nations, including the three ICH countries and many
non-ICH countries.156 As such, an ever-increasing number of
clinical trials are being conducted under the guidance of the
GCP.157
150. See id. at 1 (“GCP is an international ethical and scientific quality
standard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that involve the participation of human subjects.”).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 8–9.
153. Id. at 8. There is no mention in the GCP of the version of the Declaration of Helsinki referred to in the Principles section; however, the publication
date of the GCP, 1996, suggests that the GCP was influenced by the 1989
version of the Declaration.
154. The GCP, like the Declaration of Helsinki, states that all clinical trials
must be supervised by an Institutional Review Board or and Independent
Ethics Committee. Id. at 9. The specific requirements for review are very
similar to the regulatory requirements of the Common Rule and the FDA. See
id. at 10–13; infra Part III. A. 1. & 2. See also GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL
TRIALS, supra note 34, at 3 (“[ICH GCP] guidelines are very similar to FDA
regulations.”).
155. ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 17–21.
156. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at 5
(“[M]any countries have adopted the Good Clinical Practice guidelines from
the International Conference on Harmonization as their regulatory standard.”); Ministry of Health, Malaysian Guidelines for Good Clinical Practices
iii (1999) (Malaysia’s Ministry of Health adopted the basic principles of the
ICH GCP, with some minor modifications for local requirements), available at
http://www.vadscorner.com/Malaysian_gcp.PDF (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
157. GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at 3.
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III. ETHICAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED HUMAN-SUBJECT RESEARCH
As one can see from the previous section, there is no shortage
of ethical guides for researchers to choose from when conducting clinical trials. Yet, who is responsible for ensuring that
ethical guidelines are followed? The answer to this question is
not as simple or straightforward as many researchers, sponsors,
and participants would hope. Rather, responsibility for ensuring ethical behavior in research projects varies depending on
several variables, including: who has initiated the research
project,158 how the project is funded,159 and the location where
the research is going to take place.160
Society’s extensive use of research places duties of public responsibility and accountability on researchers.161 In designing a
protocol, the individual researcher has initial responsibility for
assuring that the project will be ethical.162 The next step in the
158. See discussion infra Parts III.A.–B. Research initiated by a U.S.
pharmaceutical company will be guided by FDA regulations if the product is
going to be marketed to the public. See infra Part III.A.2. Therefore, an IRB
would be responsible for assuring ethical guidelines were followed. Id. However, if a research protocol was initiated by an individual researcher in the
United States, who was not affiliated with a research institution, then U.S.
regulations would not apply and the individual researcher would be the only
entity responsible for assuring ethical conduct. See discussion infra Part
III.A.
159. Projects funded in full or in part by the U.S. government are regulated
by the Department of Health and Human Services, which requires research
institutions to give assurances and ensure review by IRBs. See infra Part
III.A.1. Projects funded entirely by private entities are not regulated unless
the product will fall under FDA regulations. Id. at Part III.A.1.–2. Therefore,
it would be up to the private sponsor to assure ethical behavior.
160. Most research projects in the United States are reviewed by IRBs, who
ensure that ethical guidelines are followed. See infra Part III.A. However, if
the project is conducted outside the United States, there is considerable variation in regulation of research and the identity of entities responsible for ethical conduct during clinical trials. See infra Part III.B.
161. Improper research has the potential to kill or harm participants during
clinical trials as well as patients whose doctors use erroneous results in
treatment; money or valuable resources can be wasted and improper or unreasonable laws and policies can result from unreliable or erroneous research
results. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 6. See also discussion of Dr.
Bezwoda, infra Part I.
162. Standards of conduct binding all researchers emphasize honesty, integrity, trust, accountability, respect, confidentiality and fairness. SHAMOO &
RESNIK, supra note 135, at 6. Adherence to these ethical tenets is useful in
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chain of responsibility usually lies with a group of individuals
who have volunteered to review other researchers’ projects.
These groups, called Research Ethics Committees (REC),163 are
often mandated by law.164 RECs are generally responsible for
reviewing and approving all proposed research involving human
subjects prior to the initiation of any clinical trials.165
The primary purpose of RECs is to safeguard the rights and
welfare of human research subjects.166 Prior to RECs, the responsibility of balancing “society’s interests in protecting the
rights of subjects [with] developing knowledge that can benefit
the subjects or society as a whole” fell solely to the researcher
conducting an experiment.167 RECs allow individuals independent of a research project to evaluate scientific and ethical validity.168 Their main function is to determine whether research
adequately addresses six general ethical norms: (1) good research design; (2) competent research investigators; (3) positive
balance between potential harms and benefits; (4) informed
consent; (5) equitable selection of research participants; (6) policy for dealing with research-related injuries.169 Each country or
institution differs on other specific qualities of RECs, such as
membership and types of research reviewed.170
A. Research Ethics Committees in the United States
In the United States, ethical and scientific review of research
proposals is conducted by a committee, called an Institutional
Review Board, which is generally located at the site where the
promoting the goals of research as well as effective collaboration between
investigators. Id.
163. REC is a general term to describe these review committees; however, in
Parts III.A–B., the descriptor “REC” will be reserved for review committees
outside of the United States.
164. See infra Parts III.A.–B.
165. See generally NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16.
166. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 326
(1988).
167. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES BY DHEW 1–2
(1978).
168. Id.
169. LEVINE, supra note 166, at 19, 326.
170. See infra Part III.B.
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research is to be conducted. IRBs were originally established by
the National Research Act of 1974171 as a response to several
well-publicized cases of unethical medical interventions, including reports of research abuses at medical schools and hospitals.172 There are approximately three to five thousand IRBs
located in the United States.173 IRBs are associated with hospitals, academic centers, managed care organizations, federal and
state government agencies, and for-profit companies such as
pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers.174
1. U.S. Regulation—The Common Rule
The basic outline of IRBs is defined by U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,175 also known as the “Common
Rule.”176 The Common Rule applies to all human-subject research conducted by researchers or institutions that have received funds from DHHS.177 The Common Rule has three major
components: assurances,178 provisions on informed consent,179
171. National Research Act, Pub. Law 93-348, § 474, 88 Stat. 342 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This is the same Act that established the National Commission that wrote the Belmont Report. See infra
Part II.B.1.c.
172. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DHHS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS:
PROMISING APPROACHES 3 (1998) (“[C]oncerns grew from stories of the abuse of
subjects during the World War II trials at Nuremberg, the promotional distribution of thalidomide resulting in numerous children born with birth defects,
the administration of cancer cells to chronically ill and senile patients at a
hospital in New York, and others….”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46 (2000).
176. Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest
in Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State Controls, 57
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 447 (2002) [hereinafter Henderson & Smith, Federal &
State Controls].
177. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101. The Common Rule also applies to research conducted outside the United States by researchers or institutions receiving
DHHS funding. Id.
178. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103. An “assurance” is documentation stating that an
institution will comply with all DHHS regulations. Id. The assurance must
include the ethical principles/code that the institution will use to evaluate
research, the designation of one or more IRBs, identification of IRB members,
and IRB procedures for initial and continuing review of research (including
adverse events). Id.
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and IRBs.180 IRBs are required to have at least five members of
varying professional backgrounds.181 At least one member must
come from a non-scientific profession, such as a lawyer, ethicist,
or theologian.182 Also, at least one member must have no direct
affiliation with the institution at which the proposed research
project will be completed.183 Members are required to recuse
themselves from the evaluation of any research in which they
have a conflict of interest.184 IRBs have the authority to “approve, require modifications in (to secure approval), or disapprove” research proposals.185
The Common Rule requires IRBs to evaluate proposed research based on criteria that directly relate to the provisions of
the Belmont Report.186 The Common Rule provides several criteria for approval of research proposals: (1) risks to participants
are reasonably minimized; (2) risks are reasonable in relation to
the expected benefits to the participant; (3) selection of participants will be equitable; (4) informed consent will be sought and
documented from each participant; (5) provisions for data monitoring and protection of participants’ privacy.187 Research proposals must demonstrate beneficence by demonstrating that
risks to participants have been minimized.188 Justice assessments require researchers to show that selection of participants

179. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116–117.
180. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107–115.
181. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). Additionally, “no IRB may consist entirely of
men or women, or entirely of members of one profession.” 45 C.F.R. §
46.107(b).
182. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(c). Other individuals may be invited to participate
in the review process if the group determines that their professional expertise
would be helpful in the evaluation process, however these individuals have no
voting rights in the approval process. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(f).
183. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d).
184. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e).
185. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a). An IRB should require documentation on informed consent or may waive consent in specific circumstances. 45 C.F.R. §
46.109(c). IRBs may require specific information to be added to consent forms
in order to increase participant protection. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b).
186. See 45 C.F.R § 46.111. The overriding principles of the Belmont Report—respect for persons, beneficence, and justice—are discussed infra Part
II.B.1.
187. 45 C.F.R. § 47.111(a).
188. See id.
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will be fair and equitable.189 Respect for persons is applicable to
informed consent requirements.190
2. U.S. Regulation—Food & Drug Administration
In order to sell a new drug or medical device in the U.S. market, a manufacturer must first obtain approval for the product
from the FDA.191 Any product manufacturer that applies for
FDA approval must have its product tested in pre-clinical trials
and have designed a research protocol, approved by an IRB, for
testing the product in human subjects.192 As a component of
mandatory human-subject clinical trials, the FDA has its own
regulations governing IRBs.193 Though the scope of the FDA’s
regulatory impact extends to commercial, as well as federallyfunded research projects, the main components of the Common
Rule discussed above are mirrored in FDA regulations.194
B. Research Ethics Committees in Other Countries
In other nations, the responsibility for conducting ethical and
scientific review of research proposals is held by various entities. A country’s Ministry of Health may be the primary reviewer of proposed research.195 Some nations have national ethics boards, state or regional boards, or localized institutional
review committees similar to those found in the United
States.196 Often there is a combination of review mechanisms,
such as review by multiple institutional RECs or review by a
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW
513 (1991).
192. See id. There are some exceptions to the rule that a research project
and application for FDA approval should happen simultaneously, such as
when a manufacturer has data already available from a foreign clinical study.
See infra Part V.B.
193. Institutional Review Board, 21 C.F.R. § 56.
194. MALONEY, supra note 108, at 59. See also Good Clinical Practice Program, Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection Regulations,
FDA Official website, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/gcp/comparison.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
195. Nancy Kass & Adnan A. Hyder, Attitudes and Experiences of U.S. and
Developing Country Investigators Regarding U.S. Human Subject Regulations,
in 2 NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 29, at B-49.
196. Id.
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national review board and an institutional REC.197 Some developing nations do not have regulations pertaining to humansubject research, and therefore responsibility for ethical review
may lie with researchers or foreign sponsors.198
Different countries’ ethical review procedures are helpful to
understand the similarities and differences that exist between
the United States and other nations. In 2001, the European
Union (EU) adopted Directive 2001/20/EC (Directive),199 modeled upon the ICH GCP and applicable to all member states,
which directs harmonization in the EU of the technical requirements for the development of medicinal products.200 According to the Directive, all member states are required to have
RECs that have the same purpose and functions as U.S. IRBs.201
RECs, similar to U.S. IRBs, are also mandated in Japan, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.202 In
Central America, Costa Rica utilizes institutional review committees followed by review through the Ministry of Health.203 A
similar system of review exists in India.204 Several Asian coun197. See e.g., Hirtle, supra note 30, at 265–66.
198. See Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8.
199. Council Directive 2001/20/EC, 1990 O.J. (L 121) 34 (directing Member
states in the implementation of good clinical practice in human-subject clinical trials).
200. See id. art. 1(2) (“Good clinical practice is a set of internationally recognized ethical and scientific quality requirements which must be observed for
designing, conducting, recording or reporting clinical trials that involve the
participation of human subjects.”).
201. See id. art. 6, 9(1). See also MEDICINES AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS
REGULATORY AGENCY, DESCRIPTION OF THE MEDICINES FOR HUMAN USE
(CLINICAL TRIALS) REGULATIONS 2004, at 8–9, available at http://med
icines.mhra.gov.uk/ourwork/licensingmeds/types/ctdregs_shortdesc.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2005).
202. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR GOOD CLINICAL
PRACTICE (GCP) FOR TRIALS ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 5 (1995), available
at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/par/ggcp/GCPGuidePharmatrials.pdf
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005); Health Canada Official Website, Good Clinical
Practice: Consolidated Guidelines, at http://www.ncehr-cnerh.org/english/gcp
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
203. Jaime Daremblum, Editorials: Drug Trials in the Third World, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at A20 (Mr. Daremblum is the Costa Rican Ambassador to
the United States).
204. See, e.g., C.M. Gulhati, Needed: Closer Scrutiny of Clinical Trials, 12
IND. J. MED. ETHICS 4 (2004) (research protocols are reviewed by a hospital
ethics committee and the Drugs Controller General, India (equivalent to Min-
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tries have adopted REC regulations that are almost identical to
the Common Rule; however, these RECs generally limit their
review to research on pharmaceutical products.205 In the vast
majority of developing countries, RECs are non-existent or are
mirrors of U.S. IRBs and rely heavily on U.S. regulations for
procedural and substantive guidance.206
istry of Health review)), available at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/
121ed004.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005); Krishan Maggon, Regulatory Reform and GCP Clinical Trials with New Drugs in India, 1 CLIN. TRIALS 461,
462–63 (2004) (reviewing existing regulation of clinical trials and new reforms
to allow trials following principles of the ICH GCP).
205. See, e.g., Ock-Joo Kim et al., Current Status of the Institutional Review
Boards in Korea: Constitution, Operation, and Policy for Protection of Human
Research Participants, 18 J. KOREAN MED. SCI. 3, 4 (2003). South Korean
regulations are modeled upon the REC requirements outlined in the ICH
GCP. Id. As noted in the discussion of the ICH GCP, infra Part II.B.2.ii., the
guidelines for independent ethical review committees are almost identical to
U.S. regulations. South Korea’s regulations have only been fully in place
since 2001, and therefore many Korean IRBs are still struggling with implementation. Kim, supra, at 4. Korean researchers and institutions have already complained of many of the issues that are prevalent with U.S. IRBs,
including inconsistent regulation at the institutional level and insufficient
national guidance on the actual functioning of RECs. Id. Since Korean IRBs
have limited their review efforts to drug trials, other forms of human-subject
research receive no review at all. Id. Singapore’s IRBs are regulated by the
“Singapore Guideline for Good Clinical Practice,” which is based upon the ICH
GCP. BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SING.), RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS: GUIDELINES FOR IRBS 1 (2004) [hereinafter SING. IRB GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.bioethics-singapore.org/resources/reports3.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005). In the last decade, Singapore has taken significant
strides toward becoming a world-leader in biomedical research. Is S’pore’s
Zeal Sending Wrong Signal?, BUS. TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 8, 2003, available at
2003 WL 2352450. Singapore has extensive regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical clinical trials. SING. IRB GUIDELINES, supra, at 12. However, it
has not developed regulations for human-subject clinical trials that do not
involve the testing of new drugs. Id. Non-pharmaceutical research may receive ethical review if conducted in certain hospitals, as Singapore’s Ministry
of Health requires all government and restructured hospitals to have hospital
ethics committees to review all types of human-subject research protocols
conducted within the institution. Id. at 13. See also MINISTRY OF HEALTH
SINGAPORE, NATIONAL MEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEE: A REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES,
1994–1997 (1998); Andy Ho, Medical Research—Who Watches Ethics Panels?,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 16, 2003 (inspired by revelations that a prominent
researcher, the head of the National Neuroscience Institute, had violated research ethics by failing to get IRB approval of his study and failing to obtain
informed consent from research subjects), available at 2003 WL 16359464.
206. Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8.
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Though the form of review may vary, consistent throughout
the world is the fundamental purpose of RECs. They are the
gatekeepers of research, charged with ensuring that clinical
trials are scientifically and ethically valid. Research Ethics
Committees and Institutional Review Boards are the protectors
of the people, they are the entity primarily charged with assuring participant’s health and well-being will be protected. Yet,
RECs and IRBs are often asked to make their determinations
without information that may be crucial to the validity of the
research, as well as participants’ safety. They are asked to
make their determinations without knowing whether an investigator has a financial interest in the research she is conducting, an interest that may interfere with her obligations to participants.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A researcher’s scientific and academic credentials are a common piece of information provided to RECs and IRBs evaluating
a new research protocol.207 Yet, are scientific and academic credentials sufficient information to evaluate researchers’ ability
and willingness to abide by ethical guidelines? What if a researcher has been influenced by private interests that may impact the project and put participants’ safety and well-being at
risk? Interests of a personal, financial, political, or other nature
may conflict with professional, ethical, or legal obligations and
duties.208 Conflicts of interest (COIs) arise when a conflict occurs between interests and duties.209 The first step in understanding the issues surrounding COIs is to properly define the
phrase “conflict of interest.”210 An individual is described as
having a conflict of interest when “he or she has personal, financial, or political interests that undermine his or her ability
to meet or fulfill his or her primary professional, ethical, or legal obligations.”211 A medical researcher working with human
207. See,e.g., ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 10 (§ 3.1.2 requires IRBs to obtain
investigators’ current curriculum vitae or other documentation evidencing
qualifications).
208. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 139.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 140.
211. Id. at 141, 145. This definition is limited to those conflicts which affect
individuals, rather than organizations or institutions. Id.
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subjects has a COI when she has any interests that undermine
her duty to the health and safety of research subjects.212 An
“apparent COI” is described as a situation in which there is no
actual interference with a researcher’s obligations, but the researcher holds some private interest that suggests that she
could have a conflict.213 The two primary concerns with COIs
are that conflicts will: (1) interfere with an individual researcher’s judgment or reasoning214 and/or; (2) unduly influence
a researcher’s motivation and behavior during the experiment.215
Individual researchers are not the sole entities that may have
interests that conflict. Institutions that conduct research also
have conflicts of interest.216 Institutions, including research institutions, government agencies, professional associations, and
peer review journals often have collective duties to professionals, clients, students, patients, and the public.217 An institution’s primary mission, be it research, education or public service, may be adversely affected by financial, political or other
interests.218 Conflicts of interest at the institutional level occur
throughout the various components of an institutions’ management structure.219 Institutional COIs and apparent COIs are a
prominent discussion topic in academia due to the close collabo212. See e.g., Daryl Pullman, Conflicting Interests, Social Justice and Proxy
Consent to Research, 27 J. MED. & PHIL. 523 (2002).
213. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 142.
214. Id. at 140. Interference with judgment or reasoning can result in an
individual forming a particular bias. The individual researcher’s judgment is
thereby skewed in a particular pattern or direction attributable to the conflicting interest. Id. at 141.
215. Id. at 141. Motivational and behavioral effects of conflicts of interest
are distinct from circumstances in which an individual’s judgment is impaired
by the conflicting interests. Id. In these situations, the individual acts
against his or her duties because of the temptation to advance the conflicting
interest to his or her personal advantage. Id.
216. See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Human Subject Research and Conflicts of Interest: Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subject Research: The Challenge
of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L. J. 327, 344 (2003).
217. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 145.
218. Id.
219. Id. Institutional COIs are created by the actions or behaviors of the
institution, as well as by the judgment, decisions, and actions of the institution’s members—i.e., faculty, committees, advisory boards, deans, presidents
and vice presidents. Id.
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ration between private industry and research institutions.220
Conflicts of interest can affect virtually any area of research;
however, peer review (including IRBs) and clinical trials are
particularly susceptible to conflicts.221
A. Intrinsic Conflicts of Interest
Some interests that conflict with an individual’s primary duty
to protect participants are intrinsic.222 Intrinsic conflicts are
ubiquitous in clinical research.223 These interests form the primary motivation for conducting a research experiment in a variety of instances.224 Intrinsic COIs are the self-interests of a
researcher beyond the goals of advancing scientific knowledge
or helping patients. The most common intrinsic COIs involve a
researcher’s desire for career advancement,225 publication in
prestigious journals226 or to pioneer a successful technique.227
Certain intrinsic COIs are financial, though separate from
types of individual financial gain that constitute financial COIs

220. Id. at 172. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial
Conflict of Interest in Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Institutional Controls, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 251, 251 (2003) [hereinafter Henderson
& Smith, Institutional Controls].
221. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 142.
222. Sharmon Sollitto et al., Intrinsic Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: A Need for Disclosure, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 83, 85 (2003).
223. Id. See also Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in
Research, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 759, 760 (2002).
224. Levinsky, supra note 223, at 760–61. The author points out that many
of the self-interests that are defined as intrinsic COIs have been and will continue to be a legitimate part of research. Id.
225. The more research an investigator successfully completes and has had
accepted by her peers, the greater the investigator’s reputation and ability to
direct her career as she wishes. See, e.g., Sollitto, supra note 222, at 85.
226. Id. (“The quality, placement, and number of the researcher’s publications will affect national reputation and eligibility for academic advancement.”).
227. Id. Other intrinsic COIs include “satisfaction of vindicating intellectual biases,” the desire to win research prizes or for recognition and respect
from peers, and certain types of financial incentives (other than those bring
monetary benefit directly to the individual researcher). Id. at 85–86. The
events surrounding HDC and Dr. Bezwoda are a perfect example of how this
type of intrinsic conflict of interest may endanger participants’ safety. See
infra Part I.
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(discussed infra).228 The current funding scheme for medical
research promotes intrinsic financial COIs, whether research is
privately or publicly funded.229 Continued funding of privatelysponsored research depends, in part, on researchers’ and research institutions’ ability to accrue and retain participants.230
Publicly-sponsored research through government funding is
also influenced by accrual and retention of participants. Renewal of existing government grants and the amount of funds
allocated for a particular research project depends upon the
ability to continue the research, by retaining previous participants, as well as enrollment of new participants.231 These intrinsic financial incentives motivate researchers and institutions to enroll as many participants as possible for research projects, including some that may not be entirely appropriate for
the study, thereby creating a potential conflict with patient
safety concerns.232 Despite their ubiquitous nature, intrinsic
COIs have received little attention in academic discussions on
medical ethics.233 However, intrinsic COIs are as much a threat
to patient safety as the financial COIs that have received substantial academic, media and regulatory attention.234
228. Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86. Intrinsic financial interests generally
are broader than individual financial interests as they involve issues of funding for current and future research—research that will in turn further reputation and publication. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. Industry-sponsored research generally includes a contractually
negotiated payment to investigators based upon the number of participants
she signs up and who thereafter complete the treatment being researched. Id.
These payments are intended to cover the investigator’s research costs. See,
e.g., Karine Morin et al., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of
Clinical Trials, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 78, 78–79 (2002). Therefore, these
funds generally pay the researcher’s and other research personnel’s salaries
and for facility overhead costs. Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86.
231. Id.
232. Id. A discussion of the risk to patients due to intrinsic COIs is included
supra note 234.
233. See, e.g., Levinsky, supra note 223.
234. Id. While much discussion of financial COIs followed revelation that a
researcher and his research institution had significant financial COIs after a
patient’s death in 1999, intrinsic COIs were not part of the discourse following
several other well-publicized deaths of healthy research participants where
financial COIs did not exist. Id. However, it has been suggested that intrinsic COIs were influential in research that resulted in several deaths at leading research institutions. See Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86. A poignant ex-
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B. Financial Conflicts of Interest
Financial COIs are a major issue discussed in reviews of the
current medical research environment.235 Research–industry
collaborations often create concerns about conflicts of interest,
bias, and impaired social responsibility in research findings.236
In particular, commentators have noted that the private industry concepts of profit and competition are at odds with the scientific ideal of objectivity.237 The substantial increase in funding
of research by private industry has led to growing concern in
recent years.238 Since 1980,239 private funding of research in all
ample of ethics violations related to intrinsic COIs recently occurred in Singapore. Is S’pore’s Zeal Sending Wrong Signal?, supra note 205. In April 2003,
the director of Singapore’s National Neuroscience Institute was fired following
revelations that he had conducted experiments on Parkinson’s Disease patients without their consent and without submitting his research to ethical
review. Id. The press pointed out that Singapore has openly campaigned for
bring medical researchers to the country using various non-financial incentives. Id. An intrinsic financial COI existed as well, in the form of a ten million dollar government grant provided to the researcher’s institution for his
study. Zuraidah Ibrahim, Medical Ethics? It’s Something Money Can’t Buy,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 12, 2003, available at 2003 WL 16359084. See
also, Move to Plug Loopholes in Medical Research, STRAITS TIMES (Sing,), Apr.
9, 2003, available at 2003 WL 16358811.
235. See, e.g., Henderson & Smith, Institutional Controls, supra note 220, at
251; Marci Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1516, 1517 (2000) (“[C]lose and remunerative collaboration with a company
naturally creates goodwill on the part of researchers and the hope that the
largess will continue. This attitude can subtly influence scientific judgment in
ways that may be difficult to discern.”).
236. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7. See also Sameer S. Chopra,
Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?, 290 JAMA 113, 113
(2003) (“Corporate financing of clinical research, which often includes incentives for academic investigators, may also create conflicts of interest that can
bias study results.”); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA
454 (2003) (evidence from multiple academic studies shows that financial ties
between industry, researchers and research institutions leads to pro-industry
research results).
237. See, e.g., SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7; Chopra, supra note
236, at 113.
238. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135.
239. 1980 is particularly significant to reviews of private industry funding of
research because this was the year the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.)
was passed. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at
446. The Bayh-Dole Act changed intellectual property regulation of federallyfunded research projects. The Act conferred ownership of intellectual prop-

File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc

798

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:54 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM

[Vol. 30:2

scientific arenas increased four hundred percent.240 Private industry funding of medical research grew at an exponentially
greater rate, increasing by over thirty-three times (3300%) from
1980 to 2002.241 A substantial portion of this increase in research expenditures has occurred in the last several years.242 In
2005, the total U.S. expenditure on biomedical research is estimated to top $100 billion.243
Financial COIs affect individual researchers as well as the
institutions in which research is performed. For the individual
researcher, financial COIs and apparent COIs occur when the
researcher has a financial relationship with a research sponsor
or with the manufacturer of the medical technology being studied.244 Financial relationships may include ownership of company stock or stock options, unusually high consulting fees and
speaking fees paid by manufacturers, or fees paid to community
physicians for each patient they refer to participate in a company’s clinical trials.245 Institutional COIs include many of the
same financial relationships that occur with individual reerty to the entities that performed research, rather than the federal government. Id. As a result, the Act allowed universities, nonprofit corporations,
and other businesses to commercialize federally-funded inventions and new
technologies by giving these entities the power to patent their work. Id.
240. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7.
241. U.S. private-industry allocation for medical research in 1980 was approximately $1.5 billion. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra
note 176, at 446. In 2002, private-industry funding of medical research and
development activities reached almost $50 billion. RESEARCH!AMERICA, 2002
INVESTMENT IN U.S. HEALTH RESEARCH (2004), at http://www.research
america.org/publications/appropriations/healthdollars2002.pdf (last visited
Feb. 8, 2005).
242. See e.g., EVA OHLIN, THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL
RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2004) (The National Institute of Health,
the federal government’s major funding agency for medical research, has more
than doubled its budget since 1998), available at http://www.itps.se/
pdf/A2004_006.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra
note 137, at 39 (PhRMA members research and development expenditures
have double since 1996).
243. See OHLIN, supra note 242, at 7.
244. Gatter, supra note 216, at 340–48.
245. Id. at 340. Community physicians and physician-researchers are often
paid between several hundred and several thousand dollars for every patient
they enroll in an industry-sponsored clinical trial. Kurt Eichenwald & Gina
Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at
11.
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searchers.246 Real and apparent financial COIs at the institutional level occur when the institution has a financial tie to a
private industry research sponsor through ownership of stocks,
industry sponsor fees paid to high-ranking individuals247 within
an institution for patient referrals, and through corporate sponsorship of research.248 The issues associated with institutional
COIs are particularly significant because most regulatory
schemes make research institutions the primary protectors of
research participants.249 Regardless of whether the researcher
or institution holds a conflicting interest, the risk that the conflict will interfere with the project and endanger participants is
of fundamental concern.
V. REGULATORY REFORM: RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES AND
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY
In the expanding global arena of medical research, the influence of U.S. regulations is considerable. Efforts to harmonize
pharmaceutical regulations have resulted in substantial similarity between U.S. drug regulations and the corresponding
regulations in many developed and developing nations.250 Additionally, many clinical trials outside the United States, particularly those in developing nations, are financed by the U.S. government or by corporations that wish to market their product in
the United States.251 Consequently, these trials are required to
comply with U.S. regulations.252 As well, many developing countries conducting clinical trials do not have their own independ-

246. Gatter, supra note 216, at 340–48.
247. The COIs of high ranking individuals within an institution are synonymous with institutional COIs because these individuals are the controlling
body that guide the institution’s actions and behavior. See, e.g., SHAMOO &
RESNIK, supra note 135, at 145.
248. Gatter, supra note 216, at 342–47.
249. Id. at 348.
250. See infra Part III.B.
251. Adnan A. Hyder et al., Ethical Review of Health Research: A Perspective From Developing Country Researchers, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 68, 70 (2004)
(study of researchers in developing nations reported that almost half of all the
research projects in those countries were funded by U.S. sources); PhRMA
2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 39.
252. See infra Part III.
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ently-created regulations.253 Rather, these countries use U.S.
regulations as the guide for their medical research programs.254
This increasingly global reach of U.S. regulations on human
subject research necessarily extends the problems, as well as
the benefits, associated with those regulations. One continuing
problem is the U.S. government’s failure to give adequate regulatory guidance to RECs, researchers and research institutions
on management of COIs. RECs are charged with protecting the
health and safety of research participants.255 They are the ethical “watchdogs” of biomedical research.256 COIs promote bias
that has the potential to impact participants’ health and
safety.257 Yet, this important piece of information—whether a
researcher has a COI—is often unavailable to the REC charged
with evaluating a research project.258 As the influence of U.S.
regulations expands, the failure to adequately deal with COIs,
“one of the most contentious issues in medicine today,” broadens to become an international issue.259 Now, deficiencies in

253. See Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8 (study of U.S. and international researchers showed that the vast majority believed that developing
country investigators “sometimes or always relied on U.S. human subject
regulations for guidance”); Hyder, supra note 251, at 70 (study showed that
more than two thirds of researchers in developing nations stated that they
had relied upon U.S. ethics regulations for guidance).
254. Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B–8. Nations may also choose to
adopt the GCP produced by the ICH (or the similar version published by the
World Health Organization). See infra Part II.B.2. However, adoption of the
GCP has a similar effect, creating a regulatory system that is almost identical
to U.S. regulations. See GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at
3.
255. See infra Part III.
256. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Gold, Watching the Watchdogs: Negligence, Liability, and Research Ethics Boards, 11 HEALTH L.J. 153 (2003) (discussing potential liability of IRBs for failure to take adequate precautions in protecting
research participants health and well-being); Ho, supra note 205.
257. See infra Part IV. See also Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflicts of
Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 AM. L.J. & MED. 149, 153 (2001).
258. See,, e.g., Elaine Larson et al., A Survey of IRB Process in 68 U.S. Hospitals, J. NURS. SCHOLARSHIP 260, 261 (2004) (noting that only 10.3% of the
hospital IRBs surveyed required a conflict of interest statement for a new
research protocol); S. Van McCrary et al., A National Survey of Policies on
Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1621, 1623 (2000) (survey of 235 medical schools and research institutions showed that only three institutions required disclosure of COIs to IRBs).
259. Kassirer, supra note 257, at 149.
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U.S. policy on COIs are potentially injurious to research participants within and without the borders of the United States.
The following sections discuss two regulatory reforms that are
needed to allow RECs’ review functions to properly align with
their protective purpose.260

A. Conflict of Interest Regulation in the United States
Conflicts of interest261 in medical research are regulated at
three separate levels in the United States: federal, state and
institutional.262 These COI policies are directed solely at financial COIs. The federal level of COI controls consist of the Common Rule, Public Health Service (PHS) regulations, and FDA
disclosure regulations.263 State control over regulation of COIs
in medical research is not statutory, but emanates primarily
from state court decisions.264 The vast majority of regulation of
COIs occurs at the institutional level.265 Based upon the mini260. Admittedly, there are many more issues that require consideration
when discussing realignment of RECs function and purpose; however, this
discussion will be limited solely to the issue of COIs. For a few examples of
IRB reform proposals, see, e.g., Michaele C. Christian et al., A Central Institutional Review Board for Multi-Institutional Trials, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405
(2002); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research:
Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 282 (2004); Slater, supra note 14, at 1402.
261. The term COI in Part V. refers only to financial COIs. Intrinsic COIs
would be almost impossible to regulate, as they are very difficult to identify
and are ubiquitous in clinical research, and are therefore outside the scope of
this discussion. See infra Part IV.A.
262. See, e.g., Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176
(providing overview of federal and state controls of medical research); Henderson & Smith, Institutional Controls, supra note 220 (providing overview of
institutional controls of medical research).
263. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2005) (PHS regulation on institutional responsibility for investigator COIs); 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2004) (FDA regulations regarding
financial disclosure by investigators). See also Henderson & Smith, Federal &
State Controls, supra note 176, at 447.
264. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at 453–
54 (describing how the California Supreme Court decision in Moore v. Regents
of University of California, a decision based on lack of valid informed consent,
also dealt with issues of conflict of interest at the institutional level). See
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
265. Federal regulations delegate the responsibility of creating COI policies
to individual institutions. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604; OFFICE FOR HUMAN
RESEARCH PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FINANCIAL
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mal guidance provided by federal regulations, each individual
institution creates its own COI policy—resulting in policies that
vary greatly from one institution to another.266 This section emphasizes federal COI regulation and the impact of federal regulations on institutional COI policies.
There are various federal regulations of financial COIs. The
Public Health Service (PHS) and FDA have regulatory provisions for financial COIs.267 However, neither agency’s regulations mention the role and responsibilities of IRBs in disclosure
policies or management policies for financial COIs.268 Nor do the
regulations make specific provisions for how research institutions should manage COIs—leaving this component to the discretion of the institution.269 Notably, the Common Rule, which
represents the core of federal protections of human research
subjects, lacks provisions for identification and management of
institutional or investigator COIs entirely.270
RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERESTS IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS:
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION (2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393 (2004)
[hereinafter OHRP Final Guide] (HHS Final Guidance Document discussing
ways institutions may choose to deal with investigator COIs), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf (last visited Feb.14,
2005).
266. See Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1621; Henderson & Smith, Institutional Controls, supra note 220, at 252.
267. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2005) (PHS regulation on institutional responsibility for investigator COIs); 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2004) (FDA regulations regarding
financial disclosure by investigators). PHS regulations were promulgated in
1995 and the FDA’s regulations were promulgated in 1998. OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONS,
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND IRBS TO CONSIDER WHEN DEALING WITH ISSUES
OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION 1 (2001) [hereinafter OHRP Interim Guide], available at http://www.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/
projects/rcr/rcr_conflicts/misc/Ref/OHRP_CoI.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
268. OHRP Interim Guide, supra note 267, at 1.
269. PHS regulations require institutions to report the existence of COIs
and management plans for COIs; however, there is no requirement to report
the specific details of the COIs or the management plan. Van McCrary, supra
note 258, at 1624. FDA regulations require specific, detailed documentation
of COIs and management plans, but do not specify any particular management protocols that are preferable or considered more trustworthy. Id.
270. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at 448.
The only Common Rule statutory provision for COIs is the restriction of IRB
membership against any individual who has an interest in the research being
reviewed by the IRB. 46 C.F.R. § 46.107(e). The Office for Human Research

File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:54 PM

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM

CONFLICTING INTERESTS & LAWS

803

The lack of specificity in federal regulations has had a significant impact upon the development of COI policies at the institutions where research is conducted. A national survey of research institutions came to the conclusion that the only universal feature to all COI policies was that they were totally discretionary.271 Disclosure policies required that investigators disclose COIs to another member of the research institution; however, only one percent of institutions required disclosure to an
IRB.272 Management of disclosed COIs is even less consistent.
Many institutions require additional project monitoring, request investigators withdraw from the project, or require investigators to divest their interests prior to continuance of the project when a COI exists.273 However, none of the institutions required that COIs should be managed through disclosure to an
IRB.274
Inconsistent COI policy at the institutional level reflects the
lack of specificity at the federal level and makes the need for
reform clear. Federal regulations need to specify exactly who
must be informed of investigator COIs. So the question then
becomes: who needs to know about investigator COIs? The FDA
requires disclosure of COIs to the agency and to the sponsor of
the research.275 PHS regulations require that the agency276 and
Protections (OHRP), the main research oversight body of the DHHS, developed a set of draft interim provisions for identification and management of
financial COIs in January 2001. See OHRP Interim Guide, supra note 267.
In May 2004, the OHRP published the agency’s Final Guidance Document.
OHRP Final Guide, supra note 265. However, commentators have suggested
that the final document “seem[s] to be more suggestions than hard and fast
recommendation.” Alicia Ault, HHS Issues Rules on Financial Conflicts, 363
LANCET 1709, 1709 (2004). No COI guidance statements have been codified to
date.
271. Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1622.
272. Id. at 1623. Additionally, only 8% required disclosure to the funding
agency, 7% disclosed to journals publishing the research and 1%—3 of 250
institutions—required disclosure to participants. Id.
273. Id. Subsequent disclosure to the funding agency, modification of the
research plan, and public disclosure of the COI are other common management techniques used by institutions. Id.
274. Id. None of the management policies required subsequent disclosure to
research participants. Id.
275. 21 C.F.R. § 54.4.
276. In this situation, the agency would also be one of the sponsors, since
PHS regulations only apply to research projects funded in full or in part by
the agency. See infra Part III.A.
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research institution are informed of investigators’ COIs.277 Federal agencies, sponsors and institutions are informed. What
about the body that is charged by both of these agencies with
ensuring that research is not initiated unless participants will
be protected from undue risk? What about IRBs? No federal
regulations specifically require that COIs be disclosed to a reviewing IRB. This failure needs to be remedied.
The purpose of ethical review is to “contribute to safeguarding the dignity, rights, safety, and well-being of all actual or
potential research participants.”278 While it is true that IRBs
are heavily burdened by an ever-increasing load of research
protocols to review, this does not mean that information on investigator COIs should be left out of the review process.279 A
primary function of the IRB is to analyze the protocol and ensure that the risks to participants have been accounted for, acknowledged, and then balanced with the potential benefits.280
COIs, no matter how unlikely they are to actually harm a participant, are a risk. As such, they need to be included in any
risk/benefit analysis done by an IRB. Without knowledge of
investigator COIs, an IRB may not only fail to fulfill one of its
functions but may also fail in its primary purpose—ensuring
that research participants health and well-being is protected.
Additionally, without COI disclosure, IRBs are unaware of the
potential need for increased and/or more extensive evaluation of
the project after approval—again interfering with its ability to
safeguard participants.
Federal regulatory agencies’ failure to make it clear that
IRBs need to be provided full documentation of COIs is unacceptable. Existing regulations merely give lip service to the
import of COIs and their potential risk to participants. It is
time for DHHS and its agencies to provide more definitive,
277. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604
278. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ETHICS
COMMITTEES THAT REVIEW BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 1 (2000) (Doc. # TDR/
PRD/ETHICS/2000.1), available at http://www.who.int/tdr/publications/public
ations/pdf/ethics.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
279. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police
(Audit?) Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 267, 293 (2004) (“In the area
of human research subject protection, better guidance from the FDA, HHS,
and NIH would have the dual benefit of minimizing inconsistency and relieving already overburdened IRBs.”).
280. See infra Part III.A.
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harmonized regulations for COIs.281 The best way to begin this
reform process is to require that IRBs are always provided COI
disclosure statements and management plans from investigators.

B. Regulations Affecting Foreign Clinical Studies
Changes to U.S. regulations, as described above, will help to
re-align the purpose and function of research ethics committees
in the United States and in other nations that host research
projects funded in full or in part by the U.S. government.282
However, the scope of U.S. regulatory influence outside the
United States extends beyond projects that receive funding
from the U.S. government. The U.S. market is one of the
world’s largest consumers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices.283 As such, manufacturers of these products often wish to
have their products approved for marketing in the United
States.284 Fortunately for international manufacturers, the FDA
allows data from foreign clinical studies to be used in the approval process for drugs and medical devices.285 Most manufac281. Even some agencies within the federal government have recognized
that this is a serious flaw in existing human-subject research regulations. See
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HHS DIRECTION
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 22–25 (2001) (Report #
GAO-02-89), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0289.pdf (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005). However, action has yet to be taken.
282. As noted earlier, the Common Rule and PHS regulations only apply to
research that is funded, at least in part, by the U.S. government. See infra
Part III.A.
283. See, e.g., Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Reports 8 Percent Constant
Dollar Growth in 2002 Audited Global Pharmaceutical Sales to $400.6 Billion
(Feb. 25, 2003), at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,27
77,6599_3665_41336931,00.html. U.S. pharmaceutical sales represented 51%
of global sales in 2002. Id. The second largest pharmaceutical market was
the European Union, with 22% of global sales. Id.
284. Between 1998 and 2003, the FDA received over 12,000 IND applications. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Original INDs Received
Calendar Years 1986–2003, FDA Official Website, at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/rdmt/Cyindrec.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
285. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2004) (drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 814.15 (2004) (medical
devices). FDA policy associated with acceptance of foreign clinical data has
evolved significantly over the last forty years. John Gorski, An FDA-EEC
Perspective on the International Acceptance of Foreign Clinical Data, 21 Cal.
W. INT’L L.J. 329, 333 (1991). The FDA allowed foreign clinical data to supplement domestic safety and efficacy findings beginning in 1962. Id. Foreign
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turers file an Investigational New Drug (IND) application with
the FDA prior to beginning clinical trials.286 However, FDA
regulations also allow manufacturers to support their market
approval applications using data solely from previously conducted clinical trials located at foreign sites.287
In addition to several general technical requirements placed
upon foreign clinical data, the FDA regulations include an ethics component.288 Specifically, the FDA’s foreign clinical studies
regulations require collection of clinical data consistent with
“ethical principles acceptable to the world community.”289 The
regulations specify adherence to the 1989 Declaration of Helsinki290 or “the laws and regulations of the country in which the
research was conducted, whichever represents the greater protection of the individual.”291 Along with other documentary re-

clinical data was not allowed as primary safety and efficacy data until 1975,
but only for drugs that treated uncommon diseases, provided a major health
gain, or had an exceptionally favorable benefit/risk ratio. Id. Starting in
1984, the FDA accepted foreign clinical data as primary evidence for all drugs
seeking approval for marketing in the United States. Id. at 334.
286. An IND application based solely on foreign clinical data must meet the
requirements of 21 C.F.R. § 314.106 (2004). Foreign clinical trials conducted
under an IND must meet the same requirements as domestic clinical trials.
See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2004). According to the CDER, approximately 15% of
trials submitted to the FDA with marketing applications were not conducted
under an IND. Human Subject Protection: Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 32467,
32471 (proposed June 10, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
287. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120; 21 C.F.R. § 814.15.
288. General technical components required by the FDA include: studies
must be (1) well designed; (2) well conducted; and (3) performed by qualified
investigators. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a). The data that is submitted to the FDA
must include: (1) description of investigator’s qualifications; (2) description of
research facility; (3) summary of the protocol and the study’s results; (4) full
description of the substance and product used in the trials; and (5) information showing that the clinical trials were adequate and well controlled. 21
C.F.R. § 312.120(b).
289. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a). The medical device regulations use a slightly
different wording, requiring that clinical data must be “valid.” 21 C.F.R. §
814.15(b). With any application, foreign or domestic, if the FDA considers any
data suspect, or believes it is unduly biased, the agency can reject the data
outright. See Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1624.
290. See infra Part II.
291. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(1). The regulations pertaining to premarket
approval of medical devices states that an applicant must follow whichever

File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 3/30/2005 2:54 PM

Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM

CONFLICTING INTERESTS & LAWS

807

quirements, foreign investigators must submit attestations detailing how their research program complied with the 1989 Declaration292 or the host country’s ethical standards.293
While the Declaration of Helsinki provides major guidance for
researchers, the FDA’s insistence on usage of the 1989 Declaration results in an insufficient level of protection for research
subjects. The 1989 Declaration has several significant deficiencies that reflect that this document is outdated. For example,
the 1989 Declaration is not responsive to several of the largest
issues confronting medical researchers today, including stem
cell research and use of placebo-controls.294 Additionally, while
the 1989 Declaration provides that all research proposals must
be reviewed by an REC, there is no mention of continuing review to ensure that ethical standard are being applied in practice as well as on paper.295 Key to the discussion of COIs in biomedical research, the 1989 Declaration lacks any provisions for
the disclosure or management of investigator COIs.296
Significantly, the FDA has recently proposed a major change
in its foreign clinical studies regulations.297 Acknowledging that
standards for human subject protection have changed considstandard “accords greater protection to the human subject.” 21 C.F.R. §
814.15(b).
292. Even though 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 was adopted in 1991, the FDA has
declined to revise the regulations to include the 1996 or the 2000 revisions of
the Declaration of Helsinki. FDA GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 100. In a
2001 published statement, the FDA stated that it was reviewing whether its
regulations on foreign clinical studies needed revision to incorporate new or
modified standards. Id. No action has been taken to date. Id.
293. If the research protocol followed the host country’s ethical standards
and regulations, the investigator must provide a written explanation of how
the host country’s standards are equivalent or superior to the 1989 Declaration. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(2).
294. See generally Forster, supra note 94. As an example of this assertion,
one of the amendments to the 2000 Declaration was the addition of specific
provisions on the use of placebos in medical research. Id. at 1452. An addendum on the same subject was added in 2002 in response to extensive discord
in the ethics community over the use of placebos in developing countries. Id.
Additionally, stem cell research would not accurately be regulated by the 1989
Declaration, as the 1989 Declaration only protects human subjects and not
“human material.” Id. at 1451.
295. See 1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87.
296. Id.
297. Human Subject Protection: Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted
Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,467.
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erably in the last decade, the agency has proposed removing the
1989 Declaration from its foreign clinical studies regulations.298
In its stead, the FDA would require clinical trials to comply
with the ICH GCP.299 As a more detailed guidance for foreign
investigators, the inclusion of the ICH GCP will certainly remove confusion about FDA documentation requirements and
the specific responsibilities of various parties in research programs and marketing approval applications.300
For the purposes of this Note, the question is whether the ICH GCP has
provisions for COIs.
Unfortunately, since the GCP mirrors
U.S. human-subject research regulations, it also carries the
same flaws discussed in the previous section. The ICH GCP
requires documentation of financial arrangements among investigators, institutions and sponsors.301 Yet, these documents are
only required to be maintained by the sponsor and research institution.302 As with the 1989 Declaration and U.S. regulations,
the ICH GCP does not require that RECs are provided COI disclosure statements.303
Current international ethics guidelines reflect recognition for
the need to include RECs in the management of COIs. In acknowledging that COIs have the potential to impact research
participants’ health and well-being, both the 2000 Declaration
and the 2002 CIOMS Guidelines have made specific provisions
that require RECs be provided information on investigators’
COIs.304 The revision of the Declaration of Helsinki in 2000
marked several major changes to the Declaration, including the
298. Id. at 32,468. The FDA specifically stated that it felt the need to remove reference to the 1989 Declaration because modifications to the Declaration are outside of the agency’s authority and “could be modified to contain
provisions that are inconsistent with U.S. laws and regulations.” Id.
299. Id. at 32,467.
300. Id. at 32,468. See also John Sweatman, Good Clinical Practice: A Nuisance, a Help or a Necessity for Clinical Pharmacology?, 55 BRIT. J. CLIN.
PHARMACOLOGY 1, 2–4 (2003).
301. ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 51 (§ 8.2.4).
302. Id.
303. IRBs are required to be given documentation of payments or compensation given to research subjects, but the ICH GCP does not mention providing
IRBs with documentation of investigator’s financial interests with the project
or its sponsors. Id. at 10 (§ 3.1.2).
304. Provisions on COIs in both of these documents are provided in the remainder of this section. See supra notes 303–305 (2000 Declaration), 306–308
(CIOMS Guidelines) and accompanying text.
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adoption of three separate provisions that include requirements
for disclosure of COIs.305 Provision 13 of the 2000 Declaration
includes specific provisions for the information that investigators are responsible for providing to RECs.306 Under the 2000
Declaration, researchers are obligated to provide RECs with all
information necessary for monitoring the project and submitting to the REC all “information regarding funding, sponsors,
institutional affiliations, [and] other potential conflicts of interest.”307 The 2002 CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects also ties RECs
and disclosure of COIs.308 The 2002 Guidelines’ recommendations on RECs309 include commentary suggesting that RECs
should be informed by investigators of any potential or apparent financial COIs.310
305. 2000 DECLARATION, supra note 96. See also Forster, supra note 94, at
1449. Provisions 13, 22 and 27 include provisions for disclosing COIs. 2000
DECLARATION, supra. Provision 22 requires disclosure of possible COIs to
research participants. Id. Provision 27 requires disclosure of COIs in publications of research materials and findings. Id.
306. Id. Unlike the 1989 Declaration, the 2000 Declaration requires all
human-subject research be submitted to an independent ethical review committee. Id. Additionally, under the 2000 Declaration, RECs are specifically
given the right to monitor ongoing research projects. Id.
307. Id.
308. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118.
309. CIOMS “Guideline 2: Ethical Review Committees” states:
All proposals to conduct research involving human subjects must be
submitted for review of their scientific merit and ethical acceptability
to one or more scientific review and ethical review committees. The
review committees must be independent of the research team, and
any direct financial or other material benefit they may derive from
the research should not be contingent on the outcome of their review.
The investigator must obtain their approval or clearance before undertaking the research. The ethical review committee should conduct
further reviews as necessary in the course of the research, including
monitoring of the progress of the study.
Id.
310. Id. The CIOMS “Guideline 2: Ethical Review Committees” commentary states:
Potential conflicts of interest related to project support. Increasingly,
biomedical studies receive funding from commercial firms. Such
sponsors have good reasons to support research methods that are scientifically and ethically acceptable, but cases have arisen in which
the conditions of funding could have introduced bias …. As persons
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A link between RECs and disclosure and management of
COIs is gaining acceptance as an international standard. It is
no longer appropriate for U.S. regulators to hold foreign clinical
studies to a standard recognized by the international bioethics
community as insufficient for modern ethical problems. While
the FDA’s proposal to replace the 1989 Declaration with the
ICH GCP will ameliorate several deficiencies within the existing foreign clinical studies regulations, it still requires further
amendment. In order to provide appropriate protection for research participants, U.S. foreign clinical studies regulations
should respond to the current needs of medical research and
specifically require review of foreign clinical studies by an REC
that has been provided documentation regarding investigators’
COIs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Intrinsic and financial conflicts of interest are a threat to the
health and safety of research participants in the United States
and abroad. Investment in clinical trials by industry and the
federal government continues to increase in the U.S. and
abroad, with industry financing now outpacing the U.S. government.311 With this change in the support structure of clinical
research, comes an increased likelihood that investigators will
have financial conflicts with research sponsors that may impact
the integrity of the project and the safety of participants. Studdirectly responsible for their work, investigators should not enter into
agreements that interfere unduly with their access to the data or
their ability to analyse the data independently, to prepare manuscripts, or to publish them. Investigators must also disclose potential
or apparent conflicts of interest on their part to the ethical review
committee or to other institutional committees designed to evaluate
and manage such conflicts. Ethical review committees should therefore ensure that these conditions are met.
Id. Researchers who participate in international clinical trials tend to believe
that U.S. IRB review and application of U.S. regulatory requirements are
often inappropriate outside the borders of the United States. Kass & Hyder,
supra note 195, at B–64. Rather, these researchers suggest ethical review in
the host country and that international guidelines should be the standard for
evaluating projects; in particular, they suggest using the CIOMS guidelines
for research in developing countries. Id.
311. See, e.g., PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 39; OHLIN, supra
note 242, at 7.
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ies have already shown that industry-funded clinical research is
more likely to favor the sponsor than research conducted independent of industry funding.312 Such trends support the assertion that COIs will only increase in the future. Yet, policies for
the disclosure and management of COIs are inconsistent or
non-existent in developed, as well as developing, nations. This
failure to adequately provide guidance on investigator COIs
shows a breakdown in the protection of citizenry that is the
mandate of national and international health regulators.
RECs are the bodies that have been consistently charged with
ensuring the protection of human subjects in medical research.
It is only logical that they should have access to the same information that investigators, agencies, and institutions have
regarding potential risks to research participants. Yet, they
often lack any knowledge of investigators’ financial interests
that may cause bias or inappropriately influence decisionmaking. This failure is unacceptable, particularly since it is a
failure easily remedied by simply adding regulations that mandate disclosure of COIs to IRBs. While there may be several
other regulatory changes with greater potential to improve the
system of human subject protection, this is one of the simplest.
There is no excuse for the continuing lack of action by the federal government in this area.
Influence of U.S. regulations on medical research conducted
throughout the world is substantial. With influence, comes responsibility. The fact that U.S. regulations propagate policies
that are inconsistent with the goal of protecting the health and
safety of research participants is unacceptable. The United
States has a responsibility to conduct regulatory reform that

312. Bekelman, supra note 236, at 454.
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will more reasonably protect participants and support the purpose of ethical review.
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